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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GAYLE BABBITT,
Plaintiff and Appellant
v.

:

7-ELEVEN SALES CORPORATION
dba 7-ELEVEN FOOD STORES
CORPORATION,

:
:

Case No.

981755-CA

Priority No. 15
Defendant and Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA PRESIDING

Scott W. Christensen
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 363-7611

David L. Grindstaff
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
3355 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

PARTIES ON APPEAL
The parties on appeal appear in the caption except
that defendant and appellee 7-Eleven, Inc. has been mis-identified
as 7-Eleven Sales Corporation dba 7-Eleven Food Stores Corporation.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annot. , § 78-2-2(3) (j) and Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure 3.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether

the

trial

court

was

correct

in granting

summary

judgment for defendant and appellee (hereinafter "7-Eleven") where
plaintiff and appellant

(hereinafter "Babbitt") cannot show as a

matter of law that 7-Eleven breached any duties owed to Babbitt.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There

are

no

determinative

constitutional

provisions,

statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations involved in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the order of the Honorable Anne M.
Stirba dated October 9, 1998 dismissing Babbitt's claims against 7Eleven on its motion for summary judgment.
summary judgment was brought

7-Eleven's motion for

following discovery including the

deposition of Babbitt.
1.

On March 20, 1997, Babbitt commenced this case by filing

a complaint against 7-Eleven. (R. 1.)
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2.

In her complaint, Babbitt alleged that on or about June

19, 1996, while walking on a sidewalk in front of a 7-Eleven store,
she slipped on a mayonnaise package.
3.

The

only

evidence

in

(R. 2.)

this

case

regarding

how

the

mayonnaise package ended up on the sidewalk or how long it had been
there is Babbitt's own deposition.
4.

(R. 84.)

In her deposition, Babbitt testified as follows:
Q. Let me ask you some more questions about
the mayonnaise packet. Do you know how it got
there?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you know how long it had been there?

A.

No.

Q. Did anybody ever tell you how it had been
there?
A.

No.

Q. Was there anything about it that gave you
any indication as to how long it had been
there?
A.
No.
Well, I figured it had only been
there, you know, a short time, you know. (R.
55.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The undisputed facts and law in this case demonstrate that the
trial court acted appropriately in granting 7-Eleven's motion for
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summary judgment

dismissing

all of Babbitt's

claims.

Summary

judgment is appropriate in this case because the condition which
allegedly
nature.

caused Babbitt

to slip and fall was of a temporary

Because store owners like 7-Eleven are not insurers or

guarantors of the safety of their business invitees, in order for
Babbitt to prevail on her claims, she must show that 7-Eleven knew
or should have known of the hazardous condition and that 7-Eleven
had enough time to remedy the unsafe condition.
In

this

case,

7-Eleven

is

entitled

to

summary

judgment

because: a) Babbitt has admitted through deposition testimony that
she has no idea how the packet got on the sidewalk or how long it
had been there; b) Babbitt failed to offer evidence that 7-Eleven,
or its employees, had either actual or constructive knowledge of
the

condition;

and,

c)

Babbitt

has

failed

to

establish

that

sufficient time had elapsed so that any exercise of reasonable care
7-Eleven could have remedied the alleged problem.
Given that there is no genuine issue of material fact that
supports Babbitt's claims against 7-Eleven, 7-Eleven respectfully
requests this Court to uphold the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in this case.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE TRIAL COURT
GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE,

TO

Summary judgment is appropriate "where there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving parties entitled to judgment
is a matter of law."
1996).

Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App.

"Because summary judgment presents only questions of law"

this Court reviews the trial court's decision under "a standard of
correctness, according no defference to the trial court's legal
conclusions."

Id.

In fact, this Court "may affirm a grant of

summary judgment on any grounds available to the trial court, even
if

it

is

one

not

relied

upon

by

the

trial

court."

Otsuka

Electronics v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah
App. 1997).
When summary judgment is sought, the movant bears the initial
responsibility of informing the court of the basis for his motion
and identifying those portions of the record and affidavits, if
any, he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
In a case where a party moves on an issue for which he would not
bear the burden of persuasion at trial, his initial burden of
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production may be satisfied by the showing the court there is an
absence of evidence in the record to support the non-movant's case.
"There can be no issue as to any material fact ... when a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving
party's case necessarily renders all facts immaterial. Id.
For purposes of its motion for summary judgment, 7-Eleven did
not dispute that Babbitt slipped and fell as alleged.

Rather,

Babbitt failed to establish the necessary elements of negligence in
a slip-and-fall case based on the standards set forth by the Utah
Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals.

Specifically, Babbitt is

unable to show that 7-Eleven had any knowledge of the condition,
that is, either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge, because
the condition had existed long enough that it should have been
discovered.

Furthermore, Babbitt failed to show that 7-Eleven had

a reasonable amount of time to remedy the problem.

Under these

circumstances, Utah Appellate Courts have universally held that
there is no liability on the part of landowners, like 7-Eleven.
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POINT II.
BABBITT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE THAT 7-ELEVEN
EITHER KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE
MAYONNAISE PACKAGE OR THAT 7-ELEVEN HAD A
REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO REMEDY THE
ALLEGED PROBLEM.
Following

the

briefing

of

7-Eleven's

motion

for

summary

judgment, the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of Merino v.
Albertsons, 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999), a case strikingly similar to
the case at bar.
According to the Supreme Court:
We have repeatedly held that "a business owner
is not a guarantor that his business invitees
will not slip and fall."
Schnuphase
v.
Storehouse
Markets,
918 P. 2d 476, 478 (Utah
1996) (quoting Preston
v. Lamb, 2 0 Utah 2d
260,
436 P.2d
1021, 1023
(Utah
1968).
Accordingly, we have recognized only two legal
theories under which a plaintiff may recover
against a business owner for injuries arising
from a slip-and-fall accident. See 918 P. 2d
at 478.
The
first
theory
applies
in cases
involving an unsafe condition of a temporary
nature. In these cases, liability cannot be
established unless two conditions are met.
First, a plaintiff must show that the business
owner knew or should have known of the
hazardous condition. Second, a plaintiff must
show that the business owner had enough time
to remedy the unsafe condition had the owner
exercised reasonable care, and that the owner
failed to do so.
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The
second
theory
giving
rise
to
liability for slip-and-fall accidents on
business premises involves unsafe conditions
of a permanent nature. In such circumstances,
it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show
that the defendant had knowledge of the
condition; notice is presumed.
Id. at 468.
The Utah Supreme Court applied these rules in reversing a
trial court's failure to grant a directed verdict.1
plaintiff

slipped and

fell on a kiwi

Albertsons produce department.

In Merino, the

fruit while

shopping

in

Id. at 467. Approximately one year

later, the plaintiff had another slip-and-fall accident at almost
precisely the same location.

This time, she slipped on a jalapeno.

The plaintiff brought suit against Albertsons alleging that
there was a dangerous condition and that Albertsons was liable for
her slip and fall.
Albertsons brought a motion for a directed verdict following
trial, which was denied.

The Supreme Court overturned the trial

court's decision stating,

^According to the Utah Supreme Court, "the standard of review
used in reviewing a district court's legal conclusions in an entry
of declaratory judgment is the same standard used in reviewing a
summary judgment.
That is, we review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness." Board of Education of Alpine
School District v. Ward, 1999 Utah Lexis 21. Therefore, although
Merino is a case involving a directed verdict, it is controlling in
this case as the standard of review is the same.
7

The present case does not involve an
unsafe condition of a permanent, or even semipermanent, nature.
Ms. Merino slipped on a
kiwi in 1993 and then slipped on a jalapeno a
year later. There is not testimony that the
floor was permanently covered with fruit or
vegetable
debris.
The
testimony
of
plaintiff's
investigator
regarding
the
condition of the floor was gathered from some
nine visits over a period of approximately two
years and cannot be said to establish a
permanently unsafe condition at the time of
either accident.
In short, this is a case arising from an
unsafe condition of a temporary nature.
As
plaintiff, Ms. Merino was required to provide
evidence that Albertsons knew or should have
known of the existence of the kiwi on the
floor (on the first occasion) and the jalapeno
on the floor (on the second) .
No such
evidence was produced.
Consequently, the
trial court erred in not granting defendant's
motion for directed verdict. We reverse and
direct the trial court to enter judgment for
Albertsons.
Id. at 468-69.
In so ruling, the Supreme Court followed well-established Utah
law regarding slip-and-fall cases.

See, Schnuphase v. Storehouse

Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) ("the owner of a business is
a not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and
fall."); Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah
1977) (upholding summary judgment for store owner slip-and-fall case
where plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof.)
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Babbitt, in

her brief, does not dispute that she has failed to offer any
evidence that 7-Eleven or its employees knew, or should have known,
about the mayonnaise package, or that 7-Eleven had a reasonable
time to remedy the alleged problem.

Instead, Babbitt argues that

this case falls into the second category of slip-and-fall cases
identified in Merino.

In other words, Babbitt claims that the

mayonnaise package she allegedly slipped and fell on constitutes a
"permanent" condition such that 7-Eleven is deemed to have had
knowledge of its existence and is therefore liable for the fall.
Babbitt's argument is without merit.
First, as in Merino, a food item on the ground is not a
permanent condition.

There has been no evidence offered that the

ground

7-Eleven

outside

the

was

permanently

mayonnaise packages or other food products.

littered

with

In fact, Babbitt

herself testified that it appeared the package had only been there
a

short

period

of

time.

Clearly,

such

a

condition

is

not

"permanent".
In the face of this, Babbitt cites Canfield v. Albertsons,
Inc. , 841 P.2d

1224

(Utah. App. 1992) .

According to Babbitt,

Canfield stands for the proposition that a defendant landowner can
be held liable for his

"method of operation."

Appellant at pg. 5.)
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(See Brief of

Babbitt argues that 7-Eleven placed trash cans outside of its
store, that it sold food to be consumed on the premises and that
therefore, it had knowledge

that mayonnaise packages

could be

dropped by its customers and that it was therefore foreseeable that
Babbitt could have slipped and fell on these packages.

Babbitt

fails to cite to any evidence in the record that 7-Eleven in fact
sells food to be consumed on the premises or that 7-Eleven has any
consistent

problem

with

particular 7-Eleven store.

people

spilling

food

outside

this

In the absence of this evidence, there

is nothing to show that 7-Eleven had any knowledge of the allegedly
dangerous condition.
Therefore, Canfield is not applicable to this case.

Unlike

Canfield, there is no evidence that 7-Eleven created a dangerous
condition simply by placing garbage cans outside of its building.
As the trial court stated in its order granting 7-Eleven's motion
for summary judgment:
While on its face Canf ield appears
instructive, a closer reading of the case
indicates it is factually distinguishable.
Indeed, central to the court of appeal's
finding in Canfield, was the determination
that Albertsons had notice of the potentially
hazardous condition as evidenced by the
store's placement of empty boxes and its
instituting a regular schedule for inspecting
and cleaning the produce section.
In the
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instant case, no similar evidence has been
offered by the plaintiff.
Simply placing garbage cans outside of one's place of business
does not make a landowner liable when someone allegedly fails to
use those recepticals and litters.

If anything, the fact that

garbage cans are present shows that 7-Eleven took reasonable steps
to avoid the very accident which occurred.
Wherefore, because the alleged mayonnaise package constituted
an unsafe condition of a temporary nature, Babbitt must show that
7-Eleven knew or should have known of the hazardous condition and
that 7-Eleven had enough time to remedy the unsafe condition.
Babbitt has failed to offer any evidence whatsoever on these two
issues.

Therefore, the trial court acted appropriately when it}

granted 7-Eleven's motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
7-Eleven respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of Babbitt's
claims against 7-Eleven.
DATED this

A / ^ day of July, 1999.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN, WALLACE & KANELL

SCOTT WJCHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this

/ / ( d a y of July, 1999, two true and correct copies

of BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following:
David L. Grindstaff, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
457 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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